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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Christopher Ray Schultz appeals from an order denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas 
Armed with a knife, Schultz invaded the home of Cynthia Van Tassell, who 
lived in the apartment below Schultz's estranged wife's residence. (#33000 PSI, 
pp. 1-2; #33000 R., p. 16.) He had planned in advance to invade the home once 
Cynthia's husband left, with the intent of raping her. (#33000 PSI, p. 2; #33000 
R., pp. 17-18.) Once inside he held the knife to Cynthia's throat and demanded 
money. (#33000 PSI, p. 2; #33000 R., pp. 16-18.) When she denied having any 
money, he demanded she show him her "boobs." (#33000 PSI p. 2; #33000 R., 
p. 18.) Fortunately, Cynthia managed to flee and alert the police, who arrested 
Schultz shortly thereafter. (#33000 PSI, p. 2; #33000 R., pp. 18-19.) 
The state ultimately charged Schultz with battery with intent to commit 
rape, burglary, robbery, and attempted rape, all with enhancements for use of a 
deadly weapon. (#33000 R., pp. 12-14, 36-38.) Because Schultz was about four 
months shy of his eighteenth birthday at the time he committed the crimes 
(#33000 PSI, p. I ) ,  Schultz first appeared in juvenile court (10105/05 Tr., p. 3, L. 
7 - p. 6, L. 18). At the hearing in juvenile court defense counsel put the following 
on the record: 
Your Honor, in talking with [Schultz] and previously talking with [the 
prosecutor], [the prosecutor] agreed that upon waiver and if 
[Schultz] ultimately ends up entering a guilty plea to at least some 
of the charges, the State would make a recommendation to the 
district court judge of a sentence not to exceed - and certainly it 
could be less than this depending on negotiations, but not to 
exceed a 5 year minimum and a 20 year top on the sentence. 
Certainly without admitting any of the facts or allegations in 
this matter but after reviewing the report with [Schultz], he is 
prepared to waive his rights as a juvenile and proceed into adult 
court. He realizes this situation is such that certainly it is very likely 
that he would be waived and, therefore, he's willing to waive into 
the adult system, your Honor. 
In the adult system, and after a finding of probable cause at the 
preliminary hearing, Schultz pled not guilty and the court set a status conference. 
(#33000 R., pp. 28-30, 40-42.) At the status conference the parties agreed to set 
the case for trial. (#33000 R., p. 45.) The court held a pre-trial conference, and 
again the parties agreed that the matter would proceed to trial. (#33000 R., p. 
53.) 
On the date of the trial (see #33000 R., p. 51 (amended order setting trial 
date)), however, the parties announced they had reached a plea agreement. 
(#33000 R., pp. 56-57; 12127105 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 7-23.) The terms of that agreement 
were that Schultz would enter an Alford plea of guilty to robbery, attempted rape, 
and one weapons enhancement, and the state would recommend a sentence of 
up to life with 20 years determinate. (12127105 Tr., p. 5, L. 2 - p. 6, L. 18; p. 16, 
Ls. 1-4.) Schultz then entered his plea as agreed at the hearing. (12127105 Tr., 
~ . 6 , L . 1 9 - ~ . 2 6 , L . 5 . )  
At sentencing, the prosecution set forth what the evidence would have 
shown and argued for an aggregate sentence of life with 20 years determinate. 
(03/10/06 Tr., p. 43, L. 7 - p. 60, L. 18.) The defense argued that Schultz lacked 
intent to harm the victim, both when he entered her house with a knife in his hand 
and his face masked, and when he held the knife to her throat and demanded 
money and that she show him her "boobs," but that it certainly seemed bad to the 
victim, so combined sentences totaling five to 20 years, with the court retaining 
jurisdiction, would be appropriate. (03/10/06 Tr., p. 60, 1. 21 - p. 73, L. 24.) The 
district court applied the goals of sentencing as articulated in law and imposed a 
sentence of life with 15 years fixed for robbery and 30 years with 15 years fixed 
for attempted rape with the enhancement, to run concurrently. (03/10/06 Tr., p. 
74, L. 78 - p. 91, L. 14; #33000 R., pp. 77-80.) Schultz filed a timely appeal from 
his judgment. (#33000 R., pp. 83-85.) 
Schultz claimed, for the first time on appeal, that the statements of 
Schultz's counsel at the waiver hearing constituted a plea agreement that took 
precedence over the plea agreement placed on the record at the time Schultz 
entered his guilty plea. (#33000 Appellant's brief.) The Court of Appeals 
entertained this argument, but determined that the appellate record was not 
sufficient to determine whether the parties had actually reached a plea 
agreement at the waiver hearing. State v. Schultz, 2008 Unpublished Opinion 
No. 464, Docket No. 33000 (Idaho App., May 13,2008). The court reasoned that 
because the prosecutor's statement of the sentencing recommendation to be 
made pursuant to the plea agreement was not the same as the potential 
sentencing recommendation mentioned at the time of the waiver of juvenile 
jurisdiction, there were "two clear and unequivocal, but entirely contradictory, 
agreements pertaining to the sentence recommendation ...." && at p. 3. 
Because of this "ambiguity in the record" the court could not determine that the 
state breached the plea agreement. &&at pp. 3-4. 
After remand, Schultz filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming 
that he had reached a guilty plea agreement with the state at the waiver hearing. 
(R., pp. 23-24.) In response to the motion the state presented evidence that 
before the waiver hearing the state had made a settlement offer that if Schultz 
would plead guilty to robbery, battery with intent to commit rape, and a weapon 
enhancement the state would dismiss the other charges. (R., pp. 53, 56; Tr., p. 
62, L. I I - p. 63, L. 3; p. 68, L. 2 - p. 70, L. 21; Defense Exhibit B.) The terms of 
the proposed agreement included a sentencing recommendation of five to 20 
years to be served (no probation); that Schultz waive his preliminary hearing; and 
that he waive juvenile jurisdiction. (R., pp. 53-54, 56; Tr., p. 64, L. 20 - p. 65, L. 
18; Defense Exhibit B.) Although the parties stipulated to a waiver of juvenile 
jurisdiction at that time, Schultz did not accept the settlement offer at that time. 
(d:, p. 54, 56; Tr., p. 63, L. 4 - p. 64, L. 19.) The prosecutor and the defense 
attorney agreed to keep the state's offer open after the expiration date and the 
waiver of juvenile jurisdiction so that they could engage in further negotiations. 
(Tr., p. 72, L. 18 - p. 75, L. I I .) When Schultz went forward with his preliminary 
hearing, the prosecutor interpreted that action as a rejection of the settlement 
offer and proceeded to prepare for trial. (R., p. 54; Tr., p. 76, L. 17 - p. 78, L. 12; 
p. 79, L. 14 - p. 80, L. 13.) 
Near the date of the trial the parties orally reached a plea agreement, 
ultimately put on the record at the change of plea hearing. (R., pp. 54, 58; Tr., p. 
80, L. 14 - p. 81, L. 4.) They discussed whether there had been an agreement at 
the waiver hearing, and the prosecutor informed the defense attorney of his 
reasons for believing no agreement had been reached. (R., pp. 54-55; Tr., p. 81, 
L. 1 -p. 84, L. 13.) 
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that no plea 
agreement had been reached by the parties prior to or at the waiver hearing. (R., 
pp. 85-94.) The district court found that what the parties had put on the record at 
the waiver hearing represented the status of ongoing negotiations, not a final 
agreement. (R., pp. 93-94.) The state therefore had not breached any plea 
agreement, and Schultz was not entitled to withdraw his plea. (R., pp. 94-95.) 
Schultz filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 97-98.) 
ISSUE 
Schultz states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Schultz' motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 12.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
The district court concluded that Schultz had failed to present evidence to 
prove his underlying factual allegation that the parties had reached a plea 
agreement at the time Schultz waived juvenile jurisdiction. Has Schultz failed to 
show clear error in the district court's factual finding that no plea agreement had 
been reached prior to the plea agreement under which Schultz pled guilty? 
ARGUMENT 
Schultz Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The Factual Findinq That The Parties 
Had Not Finalized A Plea Aqreement At The Waiver Hearing 
A. Introduction 
- 
I Based on the evidence presented, the district court found that there had 
been no plea agreement reached at the time of the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction 
I (R., pp. 88-94.) On appeal Schultz challenges that finding, arguing that the 
I events at the waiver hearing constituted a binding offer and acceptance that 
constitutionally entitled Schultz to what his attorney had represented regardless 
I 
I 
of all other facts. (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) The argument that a defendant gets 
the benefit of whatever his attorney puts on the record regardless of whether the 
state actually agreed to it is wrong as a matter of law. The district court's factual 
finding that there was in fact no plea agreement at the time of the waiver hearing 
I is supported by competent evidence. Schultz has failed to show error in the 
denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, 
B. Standard Of Review 
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is 
limited to whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as 
distinguished from arbitrary action. State v. Ward, 135 ldaho 68, 71, 14 P.3d 
388, 391 (Ct. App. 2000). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual 
a ,  
findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. &, State v. 
Holland, 135 ldaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 ldaho 254, 
869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994). 
I 
C. Schultz Has Failed To Show That The District Court's Factual Findinq 
That There Was No Plea Aareement In Coniunction With The Waiver Of 
Juvenile Jurisdiction Was Either Leqallv Irrelevant Or Clearlv Erroneous 
Plea agreements are contractual in nature and are thus measured by 
contract law standards. State v. Lankford, 127 ldaho 608, 903 P.2d 1305 (1995); 
State v. Fuhriman, 137 ldaho 741, 744, 52 P.3d 886, 889 (Ct. App. 2002); State 
v. Holdaway, 130 ldaho 482, 484, 943 P.2d 72, 74 (Ct. App. 1997). Like any 
contract, there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties in order for a plea 
agreement to be valid. See Haener v. Ada County Hiqhwav Dist., 108 ldaho 170, 
173, 697 P.2d 1184, 1187 (1985) (it is the "very essence of contract law that 
there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties for the contract to be binding 
upon the parties"); Corder v. ldaho Farmway, Inc., 133 ldaho 353, 359, 986 P.2d 
1019, 1025 (Ct. App. 1999) (same). Whether there was a sufficient meeting of 
the minds to form a binding agreement is a factual determination. Corder, 133 
ldaho at 359,986 P.2d at 1025. 
The district court concluded that there had been no plea agreement 
reached until the December agreement that actually resulted in Schultz's guilty 
plea. (R., pp. 88-94.) The court rejected the argument that the statements of 
Schultz's counsel at the waiver hearing represented an agreement reached by 
the parties, concluding that the comments were more in the nature of a counter- 
offer and represented ongoing negotiations. (R., pp. 93-94.) This factual 
determination that there was no agreement is based squarely on the evidence 
presented. (Tr., p. 29, L. 16 - p. 103, L., 21; Defense exhibits A, B.) It is also 
supported by the procedure that followed the waiver hearing, to wit, entry of 
Schultz's not guilty plea, a preliminary hearing, a joint request for a trial, the 
representation at the pre-trial conference that the matter would be tried and, 
ultimately, entry into a plea agreement whereby he did plead guilty on the day of 
trial. (#33000 R., pp. 28-30,40-42,45, 53,56-60.) 
On appeal Schultz argues that whether there was in fact a plea agreement 
reached by the parties is irrelevant because there was an "oral stipulation" at the 
waiver hearing that must be interpreted and enforced against the state. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 14-19.) This argument is completely without support in the 
law, and must be rejected. 
First, there is no rational distinction between a "stipulation" and an 
"agreement," and Schultz has cited no cases drawing such a distinction. That a 
I 
"stipulation" as opposed to a "plea agreement" can be reached upon the silence 
of one of the parties is a premise without foundation in the law cited by Schultz. 
I 
Second, although he has cited cases for the proposition that ambiguous 
wording of a plea agreement must be interpreted in favor of the defendant, such 
is irrelevant because there was no agreement. Schultz has cited no cases 
supporting his argument that where there is an ambiguity as to whether an 
agreement was actually reached by the parties the court must find that there was 
an agreement. 
Finally, Schultz has simply cited no authority whatsoever for his claim that 
a defense attorney can announce at a hearing a potential settlement or the status 
of plea negotiations and if the prosecutor does not state that such is not a plea 
I 
agreement then it is a plea agreement. His first argument on appeal must 
therefore be rejected because it is utterly devoid of actual citation to law that 
supports it. State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,970 (1996). 
Schultz next argues that the district court's factual findings were clear 
error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-22.) This argument is analytically no different 
than his first argument: Both are based on the premise that the prosecutor's 
silence in the face of a representation by the defense attorney constituted an 
acceptance of that representation as a plea agreement. As with the prior 
argument, this one fails because it is unsupported by law. State v. Zichko, 129 
ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). 
Even if silence could be construed as acceptance in some circumstances, 
there is no evidence that such is the case here. Schultz relies exclusively upon 
the transcript of the waiver hearing as the evidence for his argument. The 
wording of that transcript, however, is entirely consistent with the district court's 
conclusion that defense counsel's comments were a representation of ongoing 
negotiations, not of a final resolution of the case. 
Defense counsel stated that the prosecution had agreed that "if' Schultz 
"ultimately ends up entering a guilty plea to at least some of the charges" that the 
state would, "depending on negotiations" make a certain recommendation. 
(#33000 1015/05 Tr., p. 3, L. 20 - p. 4, L. 5.) This language is consistent with 
ongoing negotiations because Schultz did not agree to enter a plea (the wording 
was "if' Schultz "ultimately" entered a plea); what charges he would plead to was 
clearly not resolved, as which charges he would plead to and which would be 
dismissed was not mentioned; and even the sentencing recommendations were 
still subject to negotiations. In short, even if the trial court had made its factual 
determination that there was no agreement from the transcript alone it would be 
supported by evidence. 
The court did not rely on the transcript alone, however. In his argument 
on appeal Schultz merely ignores the other evidence presented. That evidence, 
however, included evidence of the plea negotiations that both preceded and 
followed the waiver hearing. (Tr., p. 29, L. 16 - p. 103, L., 21; Defense Exhibit 
5.) That evidence uniformly shows that no agreement had been reached before 
the waiver hearing and that negotiations had continued after the waiver hearing 
because neither side believed the case had been resolved. 
Schultz next "asserts that if [the prosecutor] felt that he was not obligated 
to follow the terms of the plea agreement that Mr. Schultz asserted existed, he 
should have sought relief from the district court." (Appellant's brief, pp. 22-24.) 
The state gives Schultz full credit for chutzpah for arguing that the prosecutor 
should have argued at sentencing an issue Schultz himself did not raise until 
appeal. In addition, as with all of Schultz's arguments, this one assumes an 
agreement despite the district court's rejection of the existence of an agreement 
based on the evidence. Finally, the state notes that if Schultz thought he had a 
plea agreement based upon his waiver of juvenile jurisdiction he should (and 
would) have tried to enter a plea upon his first appearance in district court. 
Instead he entered a guilty plea, after a preliminary hearing, and requested a 
trial. The argument that the prosecutor had the duty to inform the court that there 
was no plea agreement when Schultz was not trying to claim there was, and was 
obligated to seek relief from an agreement that had never been entered by either 
party, is flatly ridiculous. 
Schultz next argues that the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that the 
statement at the waiver hearing was a plea agreement. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
24-26.) Not even a superficial reading of the court of appeals' opinion supports 
this argument. State v. Schultz, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 464, Docket No. 
33000 (Idaho App., May 13,2008). 
Finally, Schultz argues that the state breached its plea agreement. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 27-28.) This argument is premised upon the contention 
that an agreement was reached at the waiver hearing, and that the later plea 
agreement is somehow null and void. As shown above, that argument is 
frivolous. Because there was only one agreement, and it was the one entered by 
the parties just prior to Schultz entering his plea, the underlying premise of 
Shultz's argument fails. He has failed to show error in the district court's factual 
finding that there was no plea agreement reached until the parties entered the 
agreement put on the record at the guilty plea hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectFuliy requests this Court to affirm the order of the district 
court denying Shultz's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
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